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II. THE EMPLOYER'S ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS: 
DISCRIMINATION V. NON·DISCRIMINATION 
A. Employer's Indirect Discrimination: DeGrace v. Rumsfeld* 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "[a]ll personnel actions 
affecting employees ... in military departments ... shall be made free from 
any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 1 
Typically, an employer will be held liable under section 2000e-1b(a) if it is 
shown that "but for" his own, direct discrimination, he would not have 
discharged the plaintiff-employee. 2 Under some circumstances, however, an 
employer covered by the terms of section 2000e-1b(a) legally may be responsi-
ble not only for his own, direct acts of discrimination, but also for the discrimi-
natory conduct of his employees, if such behavior is condoned. 3 Accordingly, 
where an employee is racially harassed by fellow employees, section 
2000e-1b(a) imposed an affirmative duty on the employer to take reasonable 
measures to corect the situation. 4 
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
DeGrace v. Rumsfeld,5 addressed the question of whether the discriminatory acts 
of an employee's coworkers could taint a personnel decision regarding that 
employee so as to make the decision violative of sect in 2000e-1b(a). In answer-
ing this query in the affirmative, the court held that discharging an employee 
for absenteeism resulting from racial harassment on the part of the employee's 
coworkers, when uncorrected by the worker's supervisor, is not an employ-
ment decision" 'free from any discrimination based on race' "6 as defined in 
section 2000e-16( a). This decision is significant in two respects. First, it liberal-
ly interprets section 2000e-16(a), finding that an employer's decision to dis-
charge an employee is discriminatory within the meaning of the Act even 
though the employer himself acted without any discriminatory intent. Second, 
of equal significance, the court used a "but for" causation test that did not 
focus on whether the discharge of the employee would have occurred' 'but for" 
the employer's discrimination, but instead, examined whether the employee's 
conduct that led to the discharge would have occurred "but for" the discrimi-
nation of other employees at the place of employment. The court's expansive 
reading of section 2000e-16( a)' s reference to "personnel actions . . . free from 
• By Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REYIE\\". 
J 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976). This section provides the exclusive remedy for claims 
of discrimination in federal employment. Brown v. General Servo Admin., 425 U.S. 820. 829 
(1976). Section 2000e-16(a), however, does not apply to uniformed members of the military, 
Johnson V. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Mo. 1977), or to discrimination against the 
physically handicapped, McNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990, 1002 (D.D.C. 1977). 
2 Givhan v. Western Conso!. School Dist., 429 U.S. 410, 417 (1979); Loeb \'. Textron, 
Inc., 500 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979). See text at notes 39-43 infra. 
1976). 
3 Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., Container Div., 425 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (N.D. Ohio 
4 /d. 
s 614 F.2d 796, 21 FEP Cas. 1444 (1st Cir. 1980). 
6 /d. at 804, 21 FEP Cas. 1449. 
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any [racial] discrimination" led to the use of the "but for" test in this novel 
manner, making the employee's, rather than the employer's, actions the focus 
of the inquiry. 
In DeGrace, the plaintiff was a civilian firefighter employed by the Naval 
Air Station of South Weymouth (NASSW).7 In November and December, 
1974, he received three notes containing racially offensive comments and 
threats of harm. Furthermore, at about the same time he also discovered that 
some of his work equipment had been damaged. B DeGrace stated that the notes 
made him nervous, iII, and afraid to go to work.9 As a result, he called in sick 
and remained absent from duty from November 19 through December 21, 
1974.10 At no time did he provide medical certification for his absence.1l 
DeGrace had been informed as early as December 6, 1974, that he must sub-
mit a written request for continued absence, and state ajustification for this re-
quest. 12 He was also notified that a failure to get approval of such a request 
would make him as absent without official leave (AWOL), and subject him to 
disciplinary action. 13 DeGrace never complied with this requirement. 14 On 
December 21, 1974, however, DeGrace returned to work stating that he had 
regained his health and that henceforth he would report for work regularly. 15 
Despite these assurances, DeGrace, did not report to work again until January 
4, 1975.16 At that time, he, for the first time, informed his commander of the 
threatening notes, and revealed that his absence was due to fear for his per-
sonal safety Y After reading photostatic copies of the notes, his commander 
reported the incident to the base commanding officer, who ordered an in-
vestigation by the Naval Investigating Service (NIS).IB On January 8, 1975, 
DeGrace again met with his supervising commander.19 At this time he stated 
that his continued absence was due to concern over the notes, although he also 
indicated that his apprehension would not prevent his return to duty on his 
next scheduled tour beginning January 10.20 Again, however, in spite of his 
7 /d. at 798, 21 FEP Cas. 1445. This was the second time that DeGrace had been 
discharged from his job at the NASSW and the second time that he claimed that his discharge 
was the product of racial discrimination. DeGrace was first employed at NASSW inJune, 1971 
and was the only black firefighter during the course of his employment. After a one year proba-
tionary period, DeGrace was discharged for failure to "demonstrate qualifications necessary to 
promote the efficiency of the service." /d. at 799, 21 FEP Cas. 1445. This discharge was ap-
pealed through Civil Service Commission procedures. The EEG Complaints Examiner found 
that the opinions of those who testified against the plaintiff were tainted by racial bias. The Ex-
aminer recommended that DeGrace be reinstated, and that his supervisors be admonished. This 
first discharge was not the subject of the current action. /d. at 799-800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1445-46. 
8 /d. at 800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446. 
9 /d. 
10/d. 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 801,21 FEP Cas. at 1447. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. at 800, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 801, 21 FEP Cas. at 1446. 
18 /d. 
19/d. 
20 /d. 
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assurances to the contrary DeGrace did not return until January 22. At that 
time he met with an NIS investigator, and expressed interest in proceeding 
with the investigation. 21 Nevertheless, two days after this meeting DeGrace, on 
advice from his attorney, decided to refrain from cooperating with the in-
vestigation.22 He refused to surrender the originals of the notes for handwriting 
analysis, and, on his request, the investigation ultimately was cancelled. 23 As a 
result of DeGrace's failure to seek approval for his continued absence, the 
NASSW notified him on February 7,1975, of its intention to discharge him for' 
excessive and unauthorized absenteeism. 24 DeGrace subsequently brought an 
action in federal district court against the Secretary of Defense and others 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), claiming that his discharge was the product of 
racial discrimination. 25 
The district court found that one or more of DeGrace's coworkers were 
responsible for the notes. 26 It also found that the coworkers regularly engaged 
in racially discriminatory conduct toward DeGrace and that at least part of the 
reason underlying his continuous absence was fear for his personal safety. The 
court maintained that the NASSW fire department was' 'infected with perva-
sive racism"27 and that the supervisory personnel should have known of this 
and, taken affirmative steps to correct it. 28 The court found that this obligation 
had not been satisfied. 29 
Despite these findings, the district court held that the commander was 
warranted in deciding that DeGrace's absence, without authorization or sub-
21 ld. 21 FEP Cas. at 1447. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. at 798, 21 FEP Cas. at 1444. DeGrace initially brought the present suit as a class 
action against the respondent. The district court certified a class of" all past, present, and future 
black civilian employees, applicants, and deterred applicants at NASSW." /d. at 799, 21 FEP 
Cas. at 1445. After trial was completed but before a decision was rendered, the class was decerti-
fied because plaintiffs interests were not "such as to cause him to fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class." /d. (quoting district court's unpublished opinion). The decertification 
was upheld on appeal./d. at 810-11,21 FEP Cas. at 1453. The court of appeals recognized that 
employees may represent job-applicants in class actions, but would not allow plaintiff-employee 
to do so in this case. /d. This conclusion was based on the court's finding that plaintiffs claim did 
not involve hiring practices, nor did his individual grievance (termination) implicate such prac-
tices. Moreover, plaintiff did not seek reinstatement but only damages. Because reinstatement 
was not sought, plaintiff had no stake in the relief that would be appropriate for a class. For these 
reasons, the court found that plaintiff was not the proper party to represent the interests of of the 
asserted class. /d. 21 FEP Cas. at 1453-54. See also Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 
961 (M.D.N.C. 1973), modified, 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64, 
67 (1st Cir. 1975) (employee or former employee is proper representative of non-employees 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 23); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246-47 (3d Cir. 
1975), CeTl. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (former employees who did not seek reinstatement are 
permitted to represent a class of present and future employees where the former employees' in-
dividual claim implicates hiring practices affecting all class members). 
26 DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 800,21 FEP Cas. at 1446. 
27 /d. at 803,21 FEP Cas. at 1448 (quoting the opinion of the district court which is un-
reported). 
28 /d. 
29 /d. 
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stantial excuse, was grounds for dismissal. 30 The court concluded that the dis-
charge was the product of the commander's concern about the danger created 
by an understaffed firefighting force, and was not the result of any racial con-
sideration.31 Accordingly, the court refused to grant any relief to DeGrace.32 
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
DeGrace claimed that the district court erred in holding that his discharge was 
not the result of racial discrimination within the meaning of section 2000e-16( a). 
He argued that this conclusion was inconsistent with the court's findings that 
the fire department was replete with racism, and that his superiors had done 
nothing to ameliorate this situation. 33 The court of appeals agreed with 
DeGrace, and therefore, reversed the district court. In doing so, the court of 
appeals focused on the relationship between DeGrace's fear, stemming from 
racial harassment by his coworkers, and his prolonged absence from work. 34 
The court concluded that although the actual decision to discharge may have 
been free of any racial bias, DeGrace's absenteeism was the product of both 
racial harassment and his supervisor's failure to prevent such misconduct. 35 
Thus, the district court was correct in finding that there was no direct relation-
ship between DeGrace's discharge and any racial discrimination on the com-
mander's part. The discharge, however, was the indirect result of racial dis-
crimination, and the court failed to recognize that such indirect discrimination 
falls within the purview of section 2000e-16(a). Consequently, the district court 
erred in finding that the discharge was "free from arry racial discrimination 
based on race"36 and in assuming that there was no basis for relief in the ab-
sence of any direct racial bias on the commander's part. Accordingly, the court 
of appeals vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for fur-
ther findings. 37 
In making its decision, the court of appeals articulated the burden of proof 
that a plaintiff-employee must satisfy to establish a section 2000e-16(a) viola-
tion. 38 In order to prevail, an employee who claims that his discharge was 
based on absenteeism stemming from offensive conduct of fellow employees 
must establish: (1) that the misconduct of his coworkers was racially motivated 
and that it reasonably placed him in fear for his personal safety; (2) that his 
supervisor was or should have been aware of this misconduct and of the 
employee's fear, but failed to take reasonable measures to deal with the situa-
tion; (3) that he would have reported to work but for his reasonable fear, and 
his supervisor's culpable failure to take corrective action; and (4) that he acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.39 
Next the court considered the adequacy of the district court's findings as 
to each element of this four part test. 40 First, with regard to the reasonableness 
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. 
35 /d. 21 FEP Cas. at 1449. 
36 /d. at 804, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449 (quoting 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-16(a)(emphasis added». 
37 Id. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. at 804-07, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449-51. 
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of plaintiff s fear for his personal safety, the appellate court concluded that the 
findings below were sufficient to indicate that DeGrace's fear was both reason-
able and the product of the racial misconduct of other employees. 41 
As for the second element, whether NASSW acted reasonably after it 
knew or should have known of DeGrace's fear, the court of appeals found the 
analysis of the district court to be incomplete.42 Although the lower court found 
that NASSW could have done more to dissipate the racially hostile climate, it 
did not make an express finding as to whether NASSW had acted reasonably 
after learning of the threatening notes. The court of appeals acknowledged that 
the Navy had instigated investigation, which DeGrace had opposed, but stated 
that other corrective measures may have been available. 43 
With regard to the third element of proof, whether DeGrace would have 
reported to work but for his reasonable fear of harm, the court of appeals char-
acterized the district court's findings as ambiguous. 44 The court of appeals 
stated that plaintiff could prevail only if his fear was the "determinative 
factor"45 with regard to his absence. It emphasized that "[a] proper excuse 
such as fear for personal safety, reasonably based, must not only be available to 
the plaintiff, but plaintiff must actually be acting on this ground before he can 
claim his absence was justified.' '46 Although the lower court determined that 
fear was" at least part' '47 of the reason for his absence, this finding fell short of 
the requirement that "but for" this fear, DeGrace would have returned to 
work. 48 The district court's opinion was also inadequate because it failed to 
determine whether plaintiff s fear was reasonable for the entire length of his 
absence or only for a portion of that time. 49 
41 [d. at 804, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449. Although the district court did not expressly qualify 
plaintiffs fear as reasonable, it did find that the notes were authored by his coworkers. The court 
of appeals stated that" [i]mplicit is the finding that the fear stems from the notes since there is no 
other reason for plaintiffs apprehension," and that "defendants [do not] contend that fear 
would be an unreasonable, abberational response to notes of such a tenor especially in light of 
firefighters' occupational situation where mutual dependency and cooperation is required for safe 
firefighting." /d. 
42 /d. at 805, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449-50. 
43 !d., 21 FEP Cas. at 1450. One alternative measure suggested by the court of appeals 
was intradepartmental investigation which, it noted, plaintiff claimed to favor. [d. 
44 !d. 
45 !d. at 806, 21 FEP Cas. at 1450. 
46 !d. 
47 [d. (quoting from the district court's opinion). 
48 !d. The "but for" test was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Mt. 
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a discharged non-
tenured teacher claimed that a school district's refusal to rehire him was based upon the exercise 
of his right of free speech. Thus, he asserted that the discharge violated his first and fourteenth 
amendment rights and sought reinstatement and damages. The court held that although consti-
tutionally protected conduct played a substantial part in the decision not to rehire the plaintiff, 
the decision was not necessarily a constitutional violation. !d. at 285. The Board could escape 
liability, if it could, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same 
decision in the absence of the protected conduct. !d. at 287. In essence, the Board had to prove 
that there was no "but for" relation between its decision and the teacher's speech. 
49 DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 806,21 FEP Cas. at 1450. DeGrace was absent from November 
17,1974 to January 22,1975. The court of appeals directed the district court to determine if 
DeGrace's absence for this length of time was reasonable. If the district court found that this 
absence was unreasonably excessive, it was then to determine whether DeGrace's absence was 
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Regarding the fourth element of proof, requiring that the plaintiff show 
that he acted reasonably under the circumstances, the court of appeals reached 
several important conclusions. Noting.that "[n]ot every response by the victim 
of racial discrimination can be excused, "50 the court stated that DeGrace had a 
duty to act reasonablyY This duty required him to bring matters to the atten-
tion of NASSW in a timely fashion, and to cooperate with, or at least not im-
pede, N ASSW' s good faith effort to correct the situation. 52 Specifically, the 
court stated that DeGrace could not block NASSW's investigations without ex-
plaining his reasons for such action and at the same time assert his right to re-
main absent. 53 To illustrate the importance of an employee's cooperation with 
his employer in this situation, the court of appeals noted that when DeGrace 
was discharged, his commander erroneously thought that the absence was due 
to physical illness that had not been verified because of DeGrace's failure to 
comply with the procedures for acquiring an authorized leave of absence. 54 
Because of the various shortcomings in the findings of the district court, 
the court of appeals directed the lower court to decide on remand whether 
DeGrace's commander should have' been aware of the racial misconduct of the 
employees and/or DeGrace's corresponding fear; whether the commander, 
assuming he was aware of the problem, failed to take reasonable measures to 
correct the situation; whether DeGrace would have reported to work but for his 
fear; and whether DeGrace acted reasonably under the circumstance. 55 An af-
firmative finding with respect to each of these issues would result in relief for 
DeGrace. 
The DeGrace opinion evidences a judicial willingness to define broadly 
the section 2000e-16(a) relationship between racial discrimination and person-
nel actions. It interpreted 2000e-16(a) to proscribe not only employment deci-
sions that are the direct product of racial discrimination but also those that 
arise indirectly from such discrimination, that is from the conduct of third par-
ties not involved in the decisionmaking process. With this expansive approach 
comes a corresponding increase in an employer's potential liability under Title 
VII. Although the DeGrace court recognized that an employer cannot be re-
quired to guarantee a working environment free from any racial bias, the 
employer must "let it be known ... that racial harassment will not be toler-
ated," and must "take all reasonable measures to enforce this policy. "56 The 
court, however, did not articulate specifically how much an employer must do 
to avoid liabilityY Thus, an employer can be liable for a Title VII violation 
where he discharges an employee for reasons that are normally proper grounds 
for a discharge. To avoid such liability, the employer must demonstrate either 
reasonable in the period before he informed the commander about the notes (November 19-
December 21, 1974) or until January 4, 1975 when he stated he was not afraid to return to work. 
50 Id. 
51 /d. 
52 /d. at 807, 21 FEP Cas. at 1451. 
53 /d. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. 
56 /d. at 805, 21 FEP Cas. at 1449. 
51 /d. at 807, 21 FEP Cas. at 1451. 
November 1980] ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 155 
that it was reasonable for him to be unaware of the racial misconduct of other 
employees, or that he took reasonable corrective measures. Even ifhe acted un-
reasonably, he could escape liability by showing that the worker's conduct, 
which formed the basis of the discharge, was an unreasonable response to the 
harassment by his coworkers. 
Because the court of appeals did not specify the limits of its decision, it is 
conceivable that its holding could be applied to circumstances in which the 
employer would become responsible for the actions of third party non-em-
ployees under Title VII. For example, if non-employees harassed black em-
ployees on the employment premises, it seems clear that the DeGrace court 
would require the employer to take reasonable steps to correct the situation. 
The employer's responsibility, however, is less clear where such harassment 
occurs in a place other than the employment premises. If harassment took 
place in a location where the employee was required to go to perform his duties 
the employer well may be obligated to attempt to stop it under DeGrace. The 
further removed the harassment is from the workplace, however, the less 
reasonable it becomes for the employer to have a responsibility to prevent it 
under Title VII. Thus, if a black employee receives threatening letters regard-
ing his employment at home from non-employees, there is probably little that 
the employer can do to assuage the situation. That non-employees are the 
harassing parties must enter into a determinination both of what is reasonable 
for the employer to do and also of what is a reasonable response to the situation 
by the employee qua employee. An even more important aspect of the DeGrace 
decision lies in the court's application of the "but for" causation test of Title 
VII. The court cited the United States Supreme Court cases of Mt. Healthy City 
Board of Education v. Doyle"8 and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict,59 and the First Circuit decision of Loeb v. Textron60 as authority for its use of 
a "but for" requirement. These cases employed the "but for" test to deter-
mine whether an employer's decision to terminate an employee was justified. 
Under the Mt. Healthy line of cases an employer's decision to terminate an 
employee violated section 2000e-16(a) if the discharge would not have occurred 
"but for" some direct act of discrimination on the employer's part. 61 In 
58 429 U.S. 274 (1977); see note 31 supra. 
59 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
60 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). 
61 For the holding in MI. Healthy, see note 31 supra. Givhan involved a fact situation 
similar to that of MI. Healthy. In Givhan, a discharged teacher intervened in a desegregation action 
against respondent, claiming, inter alia, that her dismissal was based on her criticism of the school 
board, and, therefore, infringed upon her right of free speech under the first and fourteenth 
amendments. The court held that in order for the teacher to prevail, the district court must find 
that her criticism of <the school board was not only the primary reason for her discharge, but that 
the board would not have discharged her "but for" her exercise of first amendment protected 
speech. 439 U.S. at 417. The Givhan Court cited the MI. Healthy decision as support for the' 'but 
for" test. /d. 
In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979), the plaintiff-employee claimed 
that his discharge violated Title VII because it was based on age discrimination. The court re-
quired plaintiff to show that "but for" his employer's discriminatory intent, he would not have 
been dismissed. /d. at 1019. It is interesting to note that in Loeb, the employee was required to 
satisfy the "but for" causation requirement for recovery. 
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DeGrace, the court did not focus on the reasonableness of the employer's deci-
sion to discharge the employee but rather, on the reasonableness of the 
employees that lead to the discharge. The real issue before the court was 
whether firing an employee for his behavior was reasonable when the behavior 
might be a reasonable response to the racism of his fellow employees. Because 
the employee's conduct was at issue the DeGrace court subjected it, and not the 
employer's actions to the "but for" analysis. It required the employee to show 
that "but for" the fear reasonably resulting from the racial misconduct of his 
fellow employees, he would not have been absent. 62 If DeGrace's absence was 
shown to have resulted from the racial discrimination of his coworkers, then his 
supervisor's decision to discharge him was based indirectly on racial discrimi-
nation, and thus, in violation of Title VII. 
The DeGrace court's use of the "but for" test to scrutinize an employee's, 
rather than the employer's, conduct is novel yet logical. As a means of estab-
lishing a Title VII violation, it is a fair approach to dealing with the statute. By 
broadly defining "personnel action '.' . free from any discrimination," the 
court recognized that a personnel action may be tainted with discrimination al-
though the employer acted without discriminatory intent. Thus, under the 
DeGrace court's approach, an employee need not show discriminatory intent on 
the part of his employer but may prove a Title VII violation by demonstrating 
that his own conduct, which admittedly was the basis for the employer's deci-
sion to discharge, would not have occurred' 'but for" the racial discrimination 
of his coworkers. 
Prior to DeGrace, section 2000e-16a had been the source ofthe employer's 
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to control and correct the racial 
misconduct of his employees.63 In DeGrace, the court of appeals used this as its 
starting point. By interpreting section 2000e-16(a) to proscribe employment 
decisions based both on direct and indirect racial discrimination, the DeGrace 
court went further than its predecesors. The net result of its decision is that in 
addition to relying on an employer's duty to attempt to abate the racism of an 
employee's coworkers, the employee may take his own reasonable steps to cope 
with the situation. Since the employee is the target of such racism it seems fair 
that he be given some leeway in responding to it without jeopardizing his job 
status. 
B. Employer's Retaliatory Action: Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co. * 
Section 704(a) of Title VII protects employees from retaliatory action for 
opposing an unlawful employment practice. 1 In pertinent part the section pro-
vides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
62 DeGrace, 614 F.2d at 805, 21 FEP Cas. at 1450. 
63 Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., Container Div., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
* By Patricia A. Asack, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW. 
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). The section also protects employees from retaliatory 
action for participating in Title VII proceedings. 
